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My talk today, Methodological Challenges in Comparative
Constitutional Law, has two parts. The first part focuses on the
relationship between the purposes of comparison and the methodological
challenges of comparison. The second part asks whether there are
particular methodological challenges in comparative constitutional law
as compared with other comparative legal studies.
GOALS OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES
In this part I address four goals of comparative study, although there
are many others.
Developing Better Understanding of Other Systems
The first goal is simply to develop a better intellectual
understanding of one or more other systems. For this purpose, the
challenges include time, the need to develop expertise, language barriers,
and the need to understand the broader context-both legal and social-
in order to develop that expertise. All of these challenges are about the
risks of getting it wrong or getting it too simple.
We all know, some of us through experience, that bilingualism is
difficult to achieve; bilegalism is even harder. Each of these risks raises
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University
Law Center. Copyright Vicki C. Jackson; all rights reserved. This essay is a
transcription of an oral presentation made at the first panel of the day at the International
Association of Law Schools meeting on Comparative Constitutional Law held in
Washington D.C. at the Washington College of Law at American University on
September 11, 2009. It has been edited only for grammar and clarity. Headings and
subheadings have been supplied by the editors. The author has added only minimal
footnotes to identify authors' works referred to in text; the editors have added other
footnotes to identify other sources.
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
another kind of challenge for scholars and that is what we might call the
"opportunity costs" of maintaining expertise in more than one system.
What will we give up in order to develop this expertise? For judges, who
I also want to think about, is there a risk of their losing what Karl
Llewellyn might have called a "situation sense" about their own
constitutional system if they spend a lot of time developing expertise on
others?
Developing Better Understanding of One's Own System
A second kind of goal for comparative constitutional study is to
enhance one's capacity for self-reflection on one's system, in order to
develop a better understanding of it. In this regard, we have all of the
challenges I set out initially, plus the following. Many of us will have
experienced that delightful moment of saying, "something I thought was
really necessary in a constitutional systems is not. Look at how well
country 'X' functions with a very different approach." This illustrates a
lifting of the sense of false necessity. But it turns out that deciding what
are true and what are false necessities is quite a challenge.
For example, the United States has what is called the "case or
controversy" doctrine, which limits, inter alia, who can bring cases to
federal courts and what can be decided.' For example, legislators who
vote against a law because they think it is unconstitutional do not as such
have standing to bring a case before a court.2 However, other
constitutional systems in other democracies have abstract review of laws;
they may let objecting legislators challenge the constitutionality of
statutes. So an American may look at this and say, "We do not need to
have this doctrine of standing." Hold on, how do you know? Consider
possible differences, taking just one factor to illustrate: In the United
States, the federal courts are very powerful and very independent. The
judges are appointed (essentially) for life. Maybe in the United States,
something like the case or controversy limitation is necessary to limit the
occasions when these very powerful and politically unaccountable judges
can intervene in the process. Our federal judicial appointment system is
not like that in many other countries, such as Germany and France,
which have fixed terms for their constitutional court judges. The point
here is not to decide whether in the United States the "case or
controversy" doctrine is a "true necessity"; rather, the point is that
1. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (discussing the "case or
controversy" requirements of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).




determining what are true and false necessities may turn out to be very
complicated indeed; so we need to add this to the list of challenges.
Identifying "Best Practices"
A third purpose of comparative constitutional study goes beyond
simple self-reflection to understand your own system, and aims at
reflection to develop a better understanding of what are the normatively
preferable best practices-what Professor Donald Kommers might refer
to as general political truths about well-designed constitutions.3 Now,
there are at least three additional challenges in pursuing this goal.
First, implicit in this inquiry is the idea that one can agree on or
develop a notion of the normative good, or of just results. I am not
suggesting that it is impossible to do so, but I am suggesting that doing
so is part of the challenge.
Second, not only does this inquiry require a normative baseline of
the good or just, it also depends on implicit notions of causality, that is,
of the relationship between law and/or legal structures and good and/or
just results in society. This is very complicated, and I commend to you,
if you have not already seen it, a short piece by Ran Hirschl in the
American Journal of Comparative Law, about the challenges of
comparative constitutional study, including questions of case selection.4
This leads me to the third challenge in research to identify best
practices, which is a more technical and methodological one, of how to
select cases for purposes of doing causal analysis of comparative
constitutional law. Again, I commend Professor Hirschl's paper. Let me
suggest that sometimes I am driven to the (perhaps illogical) thought that
maybe comparative constitutional study can help us figure out what to
avoid in constitutional design, but may be less useful in establishing
strong causal connections with very positive results because the
processes of causality (and the relationships between law and society) are
so complex and interdependent. 5
3. See Donald P. Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 J.
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 685, 691-95 (1976).
4. See Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional
Law, 53 AM. J. CoMP. L. 125 (2005).
5. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 652 (1952)
(Jackson, J. concurring) (arguing that "contemporary foreign experience may be
inconclusive as to the wisdom of lodging emergency powers somewhere in a modem
government," but that it does suggest "that emergency powers are consistent with free
government only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who
exercises them"). Whether inferences as to negative effects really can be more easily
drawn than inferences about positive effects is complex, as issues of causality arguably
may arise in both settings.
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Responding to Doctrinal or Textual Questions
A fourth kind of goal is that sometimes we study comparative
constitutional law because domestic constitutional doctrine or
constitutional text asks a question that is comparative in nature. For
example, in Europe, the caselaw of the European Court of Justice resorts
to the common constitutional traditions of the Member States to help
protect fundamental rights.6 You might think, at first glance, that
commonality is kind of an easy empirical question. You just look, and
see. But what I want to suggest is that it is not so easy. Determining
what is common has both normative and empirical elements. More
relaxed standards for what counts as a common tradition will, in certain
contexts, reduce the space for diversity and for localized democratic
decision making about differences. More narrow criteria for
commonality, by contrast, will allow more space for diverse practices. So
the question whether to adopt a narrow or broad definition of
commonality of constitutional tradition is fundamentally normative in
this context; and the research design for determining common traditions
has these important normative implications.
Another doctrinal example is worth noting. Canada, South Africa
and a number of other countries have what are sometimes called
"limitations clauses"; in Canada the limitations clause found in Section 1
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is also referred to as a "salvage"
clause.7 The idea is that if a law or a practice is found to intrude on
protective rights, nevertheless the law may still be constitutional if (using
the Canadian language) it can be "demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." Well, how does one determine what is
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society? This is the
question under the Canadian Charter and I think it directs us to a
comparative inquiry about the practices of free and democratic societies.
But this comparative inquiry faces all of the challenges I discussed
above-and translating from what is demonstrably justified in one free
and democratic society to another may not be so easy a matter. For
example, limitations that may be "demonstrably justified in a free and
6. See Michel Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court
of Justice and the US. Supreme Court, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 618, 623-24, n.26 (2006).
7. See R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.R. 30, 73 (Dickson, C.J.) (stating that Section
1 can "be used to 'salvage' a legislative provision which breaches" substantive provisions
of the Charter).
8. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1, being Schedule B Part 1,
Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. 19 85, Appendix II, No. 44 ("The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such




democratic society" with a history of Nazism may not be quite so readily
"demonstrably justified" in societies without that history.
So some challenges in comparative constitutional study are shared,
and some depend on the purposes for which comparisons are made.
There are many other ways of talking about the purposes of comparative
constitutional study. Some purposes of comparison are for their use by
judges, apart from scholars. I have suggested, in other work,9 that in
deciding whether and when to use comparative materials in
constitutional interpretation, at least three kinds of factors are relevant.
The first is the nature of the domestic issue. Some constitutional issues
are going to be decided within very well settled fields of domestic
discourse. Or they may concern a particular provision of a constitution
that is historically and transnationally quite distinct, like the United
States' Second Amendment about guns. Second, for judges, the nature
of the transnational source will affect its relevance. International law
might have a salience in some cases that comparative law does not; on
the other hand, sometimes comparative constitutional law might have
more persuasive value than international law (for reasons we do not have
time to get into but which I explore elsewhere). 10 Third, judges need to
consider the comparability of contexts (which I have noted earlier); and
on these issues the courts are going to be very dependent on the
infrastructure of knowledge that we, as scholars, develop.
DISTINCTIVE CHALLENGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON
In the balance of my talk, I hope to elicit your thoughts about what
(if anything) is distinctive about constitutional comparisons as opposed
to other kinds of legal comparisons. The reason I particularly invite your
input is because this proved to be a much harder task to think through
than I had initially thought it would be.
Limitations of time and resources, limitations of language and
contextual understanding, are challenges that apply to any kind of
comparative legal study. They are not unique. They can arise whether
you are looking at contract law or tort law or constitutional law in a
comparative setting. I have thought about three other possibly distinctive
challenges in comparative constitutional law: first, the complexity of the
historical context and the interdependence of constitutional provisions
9. See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA
161-83 (2010).
10. For discussion, see id. at 168-78.
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one on the other; second, the tendency in constitutional law and theory to
conflate the normative and positive; and third, the expressivist aspects of
constitutional law.
Complexity of Historical Context and Interdependence of Constitutional
Provisions
Constitutions are made and then interpreted in complex and
distinctive historical contexts. Moreover, many of a constitution's
provisions are interdependent on others, designed to create an overall
system or balance. So, when I discussed with you functional claims
about causal relationships between aspects of a constitutional system in
the context of the "case or controversy" requirement, I broadened the
lens of comparison, and suggested thinking about it in the context of how
the judges are appointed and tenured. On federalism issues, for another
example, I have written that it is hard sometimes to do comparisons
because federal bargains are always historically contingent and arise out
of particular deals struck by particular holders of power in society at one
time.11 Moreover, a constitution's federalist features are interdependent
because federal systems look for overall balances. But on reflection, I
am not sure whether or to what degree these characteristics are
distinctive about constitutional law. Substantive contract law's practical
meaning, for example, may depend on the broader legal context,
including the procedural rules for litigation, such as who pays attorneys
fees, or the practical availability of lawyers or of other means of dispute
avoidance or resolution. So this claim of possible distinctiveness bears
further analysis and reflection.
Conflating Normative and Positive Claims
The second feature I considered that might be distinctive is the
tendency to conflate normative with positive claims about what is and is
not constitutional. At least in constitutional systems like the United
States, where the Constitution is deeply entrenched (meaning, it is pretty
hard to change by amendment, and thus the system depends heavily on
interpretation), there is a fairly strong tendency in both judicial opinions
and in the theoretical literature to confound and mix up and conflate
normative claims about what the Constitution should be understood to
mean, and positive claims about what the courts are now doing or what
the Constitution does require. This feature, I think, might be a distinctive
one, but I do not know if it is true for all constitutional systems, or even
for all that depend strongly on interpretation, and there might be other
11. See id. at 227-30.
[Vol. 28:3
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areas of the law where this tendency to conflate also exists. Questions
thus exist here as well for further research and reflection.
Expressivism and Constitutions
So let me come to a third possibly distinctive feature of
constitutional law that may affect comparative methodology, and that is
the expressivist role played by constitutions and constitutional law.
Now, the appeal of cross-national functional analysis is great. Professor
Mark Tushnet and I organized most of a coursebook around essentially a
set of functional questions; 2 and it is certainly possible, at a mid-level
between high theory and concrete detail, to identify functions that are
performed by almost all constitutions. All constitutions deal with
allocation of governmental powers, for example. All constitutions deal
with the composition and structure of government. Constitutions are
supposed to be functional, and so situating research in a functional
problem-oriented analysis makes sense.
But constitutions also serve as a form of public law that is
particularly situated to express, or help constitute, or (possibly even)
influence national identity. If we listen to some constitutional preambles
(which I love to read) you can hear this. Iraq's Constitution asserts in its
preamble, "We are the people of the land between two rivers, the
homeland of the apostles and prophets,.... pioneers of civilization....
Upon our land the first law made by man was passed.... 13 This is a
claim about who the people are. The preamble of the Constitution of
China reads like a tract on national history and the accomplishments of a
collective people. 14 The French Constitution proclaims its commitment
to the declaration of rights of man and proclaims France an indivisible,
secular, democratic and social republic. 15 The German Basic Law (its
constitution) asserts Germans' responsibilities before God and man.
16
The Irish Constitution invokes the "Most Holy Trinity."'
17
These are not claims about function and purpose; these are claims
about identity and self-expression. The point here is the degree to which
the expressive components of constitutions may complicate our efforts to
do comparative analysis at the functional level.
12. VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d
ed. 2006).
13. PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, preamble (2005).
14. See XIAN FA preamble (1982) (P.R.C.).
15. 1958 CONST. art. 1.
16. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (federal constitution),
Preamble, May 23, 1949 (F.R.G.).
17. Ir. CONST., 1937.
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I do want to resist, however, efforts to posit functionalism as an
opposite to expressivism. Good comparative analysis tries to reconcile
rather than choose between them. My own effort at reconciliation leads
me to think that there is a kind of contextualized functionalism, which
requires: (1) a willingness to question whether functions, concepts, or
doctrines that appear similar may in fact be quite different in different
societies; (2) an attention to how seemingly separate institutions or legal
practices are connected to, and influenced by, others; and (3) a
commitment to be open to noticing how legal rules or doctrines may be
affected by the identitarian or expressivist aspects of the constitution.
I am going to stop speaking now because I do not want to run over
my time. I thank you for your attention and look forward to further
discussion.
